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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Amembassy BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USNATO AND USEC
Amembassy PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD

FROM : Department of State DATE:

SUBJECT : Materials on ABM

MAR 19 9 15 AM '69

REF :

Attached is a set of materials describing the new ABM system announced by the President which may be of use to you in answering queries about the new system. All of the material is unclassified and most of it has been transmitted to overseas missions already by USIA.

ROGERS

Enclosures:

1. News Release dated March 14, 1969 (Statement by Deputy Sec. of Defense David Packard)
2. Description of the System
3. Transcript of Press Conference, 3/14/69
4. Press Release dated 3/14/69 (Statement of the President)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *M. J. Lawrence* DATE *3/15/69*

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE _____

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Action Taken:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

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Initials: _____
Drafted by: EUR/RPM:KDCollins:mm
Date: 3/18/69
Approved by: EUR/RPM: Ralph J. McGuire

Clearances:

EUR/RPM - Mr. Baker J/PM - Mr. Sloss



NEWS RELEASE

PLANS NO. 100-10

2

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

March 14, 1969

Oxford 7-3189 (Copies)
Oxford 7-5131 (Info.)
NO. 190-69

STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DAVID PACKARD

Mr. Laird, Dr. Foster, the Service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have examined thoroughly the ballistic missile defense issues. We have examined the needs for such a defense, the objectives of the program, the technical feasibility and the various alternatives available. After this extensive review, we forwarded our conclusion and recommendations to the President. These views can be summarized as follows:

1. We have not recommended deployment of a defense of major cities against a massive attack, the kind the Soviets could launch, because it would not materially increase our security. We must deter such attacks with our retaliatory forces.
2. Protection against ballistic missiles can and should be made available to our land-based nuclear-war deterrent forces. Such added protection will help insure the survival of the American deterrent forces in the face of the still growing Soviet threat. We recommended that an ABM system be configured so that extra protection and warning will be given to missiles, bombers, and the national control center as the threat develops.
3. The people of our country can be protected effectively from a small missile attack, the kind the Chinese Communists will probably be able to launch sometime in the 1970s. We judge such a defense to be a prudent and practicable measure and recommended that it be deployed as the threat develops.
4. Locating sites away from major cities should make clear to the Soviet Union that the American defense is designed to preserve our deterrent--not to change the strategic balance. We recommended that the sites for ABM radars and missiles be determined by the needs of the defense and that they be moved away from cities to the extent practical.
5. A careful review of existing ballistic missile defense components convinces us that the program is sound and feasible technically. We so informed the President.
6. A phased installation of a ballistic missile defense will provide the option to meet the threats as they materialize. We recommended a specific deployment plan to meet this objective.
7. Such a deployment plan would provide for early shake-down of integrated operational components and offer the most economical deployment.
8. A decision to deploy such a defense, and the timing of the deployment is fully consistent with our national objective of meaningful agreements with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic offensive and defensive systems.

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9. A rigorous research and development effort is needed to seek better ways to defend against enemy missiles. We recommended that these efforts be continued.

The Department of Defense sent the President its analysis of four basic possible resolutions of the ballistic missile defense issue. These options were:

1. A heavy defense designed to protect major cities against a massive attack.
2. The existing Sentinel.
3. Modifications of Sentinel that would improve planned protection of our deterrent forces as the threat materializes, protect our population against a small attack, and demonstrate clearly that we are not attempting a heavy defense of major cities.
4. Cancellation of Sentinel, continuing just research and development but with no real option to deploy a defense in the next two or three years, regardless of the threat that may develop.

The President, as you know, rejected a heavy city defense, rejected the option of no defense and approved the phased protection of our land-based forces and the light, overall protection of population. This deployment will permit a shift of radar and missile sites away from major cities.

Our budget-revision request to the Congress will reflect those Presidential decisions. Budget details will be announced when they have been submitted to the Congress. In general, I can say that the President's decision will permit us to reduce ballistic missile defense obligation in this fiscal year and the next by a total of \$1 billion. Total investment costs of the fully deployed missile defense will be somewhat more than the Sentinel.



The net effect of the new decisions is to establish a MODIFIED SENTINEL program which will enhance our ability to deter a massive attack and provide a capability to defend against a small attack. Thus, for an acceptable cost, we add significantly to the credibility of our deterrent posture and to the security of the American people.

The concepts involved in protection against missile attack are complex. They have raised many difficult questions during recent public discussion of the Sentinel system. In order to contribute to an informed discussion, I want to describe the MODIFIED SENTINEL, particularly its deployment sequence, and finally answer further questions that you might have.

END

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the
MODIFIED
SENTINEL



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3. GAZETTE CARRIES CP DISPATCH WHICH STATES SOME WASHINGTON OBSERVERS SEE ABM QUESTION QTE AS ANOTHER OF THOSE HEATED BUT TEMPORARY FLURRIES THWT STIR UP CANADIAN-U S RELATIONSHIP FROM TIME TO TIME. UNQTE GORDON PAVE IF HIS EDITORIAL PAGE COLUMN OBSERVES THAT QTE BECAUSE OF RATHER UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES, CANADA HAS MORE LEVERAGE IN THIS CASE THAN HAS GENERALLY BEEN RECOGNIZED. REASON FOR THIS IS THAT DEBATE OVER SYSTEM IN U S IS FAR FROM OVER, AND PRESIDENT FACES TOUGH SLEDDING IN CONGRESS WHEN HE SEEKS TO HAVE FUNDS FOR ABM APPROPRIATED. UNQTE DISSENT FROM CANADA WOULD NOT CHANGE NEXON'S MIND, PAPE STATES, BUT QTE IT WOULD PROVIDE SOME USEFUL AMMUNITION FOR OPPONENTS OF SYSTEM IN CONGRESS. UNQTE

4. PAPE CONCLUDES: QTE DECISION MR. TRUDEAU WILL HAVE TO MAKE AFTER HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT IS NOT GOING TO BE AN EASY ONE. WHATEVER HE DOES, IT SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN TO PROVOKE AN POLITICAL STORM.

5. QTE COMBINED WITH CONTROVERSY THAT'S ALMOST CERTAIN TO ARISE WHEN CABINET STARTS MAKING SOME FINAL DECISIONS ON DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW OVER NEXT WEEKEND, PROSPECTS ARE FOR TROUBLED TIMES AHEAD FOR GOVERNMENT. UNQTE SMITH
BT

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ABM DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES

1. THICK ANTI-SOVIET DEFENSE OF CITIES
2. ORIGINAL SENTINEL
3. MODIFIED SENTINEL
4. NO ABM DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: March 24, 1969

EUR

PARTICIPANTS: A. F. Holleman
Third Secretary
Embassy of the Netherlands

G. Solntsev
Commercial Attache
Embassy of the U.S.S.R.

J. Broh-Kahn
Amembassy OTTAWA

SUBJECT : Solntsev Query Re ABM and U.S. Views on
Sino-Soviet Border Dispute

Mr. Holleman brought over Mr. Solntsev to introduce him to me at the Pakistan National Day reception. After discussing hockey and sports for awhile, Mr. Solntsev asked me what the purpose of the ABM installation was.. I replied that it was defensive in nature to protect our missile sites. Solntsev wanted to know if the protection was mainly against China and I said that the installations were meant to protect our missiles from attack, perhaps by accident, from any quarter without designating any countries. Solntsev also wanted to know what the U.S. views on the Sino-Soviet border dispute were. I replied that I could not speak for the United States Government on this, but assumed in general that our country hoped for peaceful relations throughout the world.

JBR
ECON: JBroh-Kahn:mlb
3/25/69

Clearance
ECON: CGWootton

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THE MODIFIED SENTINEL

REFLECTS THE THICK SYSTEM

ENSURES DEPLOYMENT TO THREAT DEVELOPMENT

MAINTAINS PROTECTION OF OUR DETERRENT FORCES

PROVIDES AIR-DEFENSE OF OUR POPULATION AGAINST LIGHT OR

IRRATIONAL ATTACK AND AGAINST ACCIDENTAL LAUNCHES

REFLECTS THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

RESERVES THE OPTION TO CANCEL OR REORIENT IF ARMS

CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED

STRENGTHENS OUR R&D EFFORT

MOVES SITES AWAY FROM MAJOR CITIES